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OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant Tolman objects to Respondent's recitation 
of the facts in that it mischaracterizes and editorializes the 
testimony presented at trial. Notwithstanding the difficulty of 
breathing life into a cold trial record, several references to 
the evidence are flatly misstated, 
1. Trial exhibit seven does not refer to Jim Ashby's 
"favorable" report. Nor did any of the witness statements cited 
characterize Ashby's report as "favorable". 
2. Harman may have told Tolman something about Trial 
Exhibit eight, but he certainly-did not tell him to do all of the 
things referenced. Appellant objects to the use of the 
conjunctive "and" and also the term "one-page short report". No 
one testified to that, not even Sam Dawson who cannot recall 
which, if either, term "short" or "one-page" was used. 
3. Respondent ignores the testimony of several wit-
nesses and draws conclusions which are not consistent with 
evidence. 
a. No one testifies that Tolman gave Larsen the 
seven-page report, but merely that Murray Fire received a courte-
sy copy. 
b. Larsen disavowed ever having a copy of the report. 
(See Appellant's Brief, footnote 13.) 
c. Tolman, while referencing the terras "destroy", "get 
rid of", "paper the walls with", "eat", and "deep six", never 
tells Larsen to physically destroy the report but to keep it in 
case there was a further court action. (R. 532 T. 1256-58.) 
4. Sam Dawson does not state in his testimony that the 
second report was "quickly" approved, and Respondent's observa-
tion of the evidence is strictly editorial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
In response to Respondent's Point II Part A., Appel-
lants would refer this Court to a closer reading of In the Matter 
of a Criminal Investigation, 79 UAR 3 (Ut. S.Ct., March 31, 
1988). In his opinion, Mr. Justice Zimmerman examines the 
holding in State v. Ruggeri, 19 U.2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967). 
At footnotes 17 and 18, he specifically finds that Ruggeri 
establishes notice requirements which are consistent with Appel-
lant's previous argument. Moreover, those requirements were not 
met in this case and this matter should be reversed for that 
reason above. 
Regarding Respondent's argument to Point II Part C , 
Appellant's Brief contains all which Respondent is unable to 
find. Paragraph six of the Statement of the Case and footnote 10 
concisely express the issue regarding Christensen1s testimony 
which was excluded due to court error. 
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POINT IV 
THE INCLUSION OF "GOD" IN JURY DELIBERATIONS 
WAS IMPROPER IN THIS INSTANCE AS 
WAS THE USE OF A DICTIONARY 
A. DICTIONARY 
Respondent points out that the record before this Court 
is silent regarding the jury's use of a dictionary during delib-
erations* (Brief of Respondent, p„ 40.) However, Respondent 
does not deny that fact because Respondent knew and now knows of 
its occurrence. Appellant was the only participant without 
knowledge of that fact, not learning of same until after the 
Notice of Appeal herein was filed. 
It follows that Appellant cannot tell this Court the 
extent of use of the dictionary by the jury since, (1) he is 
precluded from supplementing the record to even point out the 
fact of its use and, (2) had no opportunity for an evidentiary 
hearing to ask the jurors about its extent. 
If this Court forecloses this issue then it also opens 
the door for courts and/or prosecutors to preclude introduction 
of virtually any potentially prejudicial error which is hidden 
from defendants, ex parte, until after transmission of the record 
on appeal. The interests of justice require an evidentiary 
hearing on this issue. 
B. GOD 
Respondent declares that State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
1236, 1246 (Utah 1988), precludes judicial review of this issue 
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as being a probe into the theological debate over the very 
existence of Godc (R. Brief, p. 39.) Respondent misses the 
substance of the issue. 
God's existence has no significance to this argument. 
That six jurors relied on answers to prayer which they believe 
were supplied by an existing God of mutual perception jjs signifi-
cant. Whether or not they were influenced by fantasy or reality 
is not the issue. The issues are, were the answers to the prayer 
"extraneous prejudicial information" or "outside influence"? 
If the perceived communications from God went to the 
ultimate question of guilt, as alleged, then the result is 
undeniably "prejudicial". 
Therefore, was it "extraneous"? Since "God" was not a 
witness subject to cross-examination, his (or her or it's) 
opinion is "extraneous" testimony and should not have been 
considered. 
The "outside influence" question is even more profound. 
It is not just a question of God taking part in deliberations 
within the real or imagined context of the participating jurors' 
prayerful conduct, it must be viewed as the direct insertion of 
authority, (i.e., influence), outside and beyond the charge of 
the court and the presentation of evidence. It strikes at the 
heart of the constitutional prohibitions against the merger of 
church and state. 
This is not a case of faith in a common God which 
results in perceived guidance? it is a case of submission to 
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religious authority pursuant to the laws of a common religion. 
It is not guidance so much as it is the following of orders. 
The recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State 
v. DeMille is cited by respondent as being dispositive of this 
issue. 83 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8 (May 26, 1988). (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 39.) 
The case is clearly distinguishable. In DeMille, one 
juror held a private prayer "during closing argument" then later 
professed her belief of guilt, (derived by divine revelation), 
during deliberation. "At most, it suggests that one juror may 
have been personally influenced by her own 'revelation,1 and that 
she told others of her experience as one means of (persuasion)." 
Id. at p. 8. 
In this case, three-fourths of the jury, (previously 
committed to acquittal based upon the evidence), agreed to submit 
the ultimate verdict, en masse, to the divine answer to a prayer 
by one of its members, who would (and did) communicate his 
revelation to the others. 
In his dissent in DeMille, Justice Stewart's fears of 
this very scenario were realized. 
"Verdicts based on chance . . . (are) subject 
to challenge . . . Thus, if jurors were to 
agree that a verdict would be based on a 
"divine sign" (rather than the evidence) . . 
. (the right to due process and a jury trial 
would be denied.)" At p. 9. 
Justice Stewart's dissent states that verdicts need be 
based on the evidence and law it receives, not on "God's judg-
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ment" which is a "throw-back" to "trial by ordeal". He differ-
entiates between divine guidance in assessing the evidence 
(permissible) and guidance regarding the actual verdict, (Id. at 
p. 9.) 
The dissent also places great import on the "divinely 
inspired" DeMille juror's leadership role as effecting the degree 
of influence. (Id, at p. 10.) This case is a classic example of 
the scenario Justice Stewart feared. The prayer leader exerted 
the power of the "priesthood" in cementing the influence of his 
revelation. 
The majority opinion in DeMille would also support 
Appellant's claim of misconduct. DeMille holds that the indi-
vidual (not group) prayer of a juror (not a jury) is part of the 
personal decision process so long as the juror is "capable of 
fairly weighing the evidence". (Id, at p. 8.) The fate of 
Appellant ceased to become personal in this case when the 
"priesthood" replaced the evidence and the law. Six personal 
decisions became a lock-step block of six subjected to an outside 
authority. 
Rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, differentiates 
between the influence brought to bear on "any juror" and that 
brought to the attention of "the jury", an important distinction. 
The DeMille court only considered the influence of "any 
(one) juror" who may have persuaded others based upon her own 
pre-deliberation experience. It did not consider the en masse 
prayer during deliberation nor, more importantly, the influence 
of the authority of the "priesthood". 
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Furtherf the majority in DeMille surely would not have 
come to the same conclusion if the majority of the jury would 
have agreed, in advance, to base their verdict on defense coun-
sels eye contact (as did the one) rather than the evidence, any 
more than they would a verdict based upon a majority coin flip. 
One juror's "coin flip" decision might be acceptable since seven 
others' decisions are based upon the evidence; eight juror's 
acceptance of the coin flip would never be acceptable; the line 
between the two must be drawn somewhere in between. When it is 
clear that the final verdict resulted from the persuasive 
intractability of six coin flippers, due process is not possible. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein and as previously pre-
sented to this Court, this matter should be reversed and remanded 
to the trial court for dismissal or new trial. 
DATED this
 / ^  day of August, 1988. 
^£^t ~p, $Jj y/n Sc</£_ 
LOfll F. DeXAND" ™ 
Attorney for Appellant 
SCOTT W. REED 
Attorney for Appellant 
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